feat(V2): X-Bot-Tag header obbligatorio + endpoint /admin/audit con filtri

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
AdrianoDev
2026-05-01 08:51:40 +02:00
parent bd6b03ce43
commit 69ac878893
10 changed files with 549 additions and 8 deletions
+2
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from typing import Literal, cast
import uvicorn
from fastapi import FastAPI
from cerbero_mcp import admin
from cerbero_mcp.client_registry import ClientRegistry
from cerbero_mcp.common.logging import configure_root_logging
from cerbero_mcp.exchanges import build_client
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ def _make_app(settings: Settings) -> FastAPI:
app.include_router(alpaca.make_router())
app.include_router(macro.make_router())
app.include_router(sentiment.make_router())
app.include_router(admin.make_admin_router())
return app
+158
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@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
"""Endpoint admin: query audit log con filtri."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Literal
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Request
MAX_RECORDS = 10000
DEFAULT_LIMIT = 1000
def _parse_iso(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
if not value:
return None
try:
# supporta sia "2026-05-01" sia "2026-05-01T12:34:56Z"
return datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, f"invalid datetime: {value}") from e
def _record_timestamp(rec: dict[str, Any]) -> datetime | None:
"""Estrae il timestamp da un record audit. JsonFormatter mette 'asctime'
in formato '2026-05-01 12:34:56,789'. Lo parsiamo come UTC.
"""
ts = rec.get("asctime") or rec.get("timestamp")
if not ts:
return None
try:
# asctime format default: 'YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS,mmm'
ts_clean = ts.replace(",", ".")
return datetime.fromisoformat(ts_clean)
except ValueError:
return None
def _matches_filters(
rec: dict[str, Any],
*,
from_dt: datetime | None,
to_dt: datetime | None,
actor: str | None,
exchange: str | None,
action: str | None,
bot_tag: str | None,
) -> bool:
if rec.get("audit_event") != "write_op":
return False
if actor is not None and rec.get("actor") != actor:
return False
if exchange is not None and rec.get("exchange") != exchange:
return False
if action is not None and rec.get("action") != action:
return False
if bot_tag is not None and rec.get("bot_tag") != bot_tag:
return False
if from_dt is not None or to_dt is not None:
rec_ts = _record_timestamp(rec)
if rec_ts is None:
return False
if from_dt is not None and rec_ts < from_dt:
return False
if to_dt is not None and rec_ts > to_dt:
return False
return True
def _read_audit_records(file_path: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if not file_path.exists():
return []
out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
with file_path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
for line in f:
stripped = line.strip()
if not stripped:
continue
try:
out.append(json.loads(stripped))
except json.JSONDecodeError:
continue
return out
def make_admin_router() -> APIRouter:
r = APIRouter(prefix="/admin", tags=["admin"])
@r.get("/audit")
async def query_audit(
request: Request,
from_: str | None = Query(None, alias="from"),
to: str | None = Query(None),
actor: Literal["testnet", "mainnet"] | None = Query(None),
exchange: str | None = Query(None),
action: str | None = Query(None),
bot_tag: str | None = Query(None),
limit: int = Query(DEFAULT_LIMIT, ge=1, le=MAX_RECORDS),
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Restituisce i record audit_write_op filtrati.
Param query (tutti opzionali):
- from / to: ISO 8601 datetime (es. 2026-05-01 oppure 2026-05-01T12:34:56)
- actor: testnet | mainnet
- exchange: deribit | bybit | hyperliquid | alpaca
- action: nome del tool (es. place_order)
- bot_tag: identificatore bot
- limit: max record da ritornare (default 1000, max 10000)
Source: AUDIT_LOG_FILE (env var). Se non settata, ritorna lista vuota
con warning.
"""
from_dt = _parse_iso(from_)
to_dt = _parse_iso(to)
file_str = os.environ.get("AUDIT_LOG_FILE", "").strip()
if not file_str:
return {
"records": [],
"count": 0,
"warning": "AUDIT_LOG_FILE not configured; no persistent audit log to query",
"from": from_,
"to": to,
}
file_path = Path(file_str)
all_records = _read_audit_records(file_path)
filtered = [
rec for rec in all_records
if _matches_filters(
rec,
from_dt=from_dt, to_dt=to_dt,
actor=actor, exchange=exchange, action=action,
bot_tag=bot_tag,
)
]
# sort desc per timestamp (ultimi prima) + limit
filtered.sort(
key=lambda rec: _record_timestamp(rec) or datetime.min,
reverse=True,
)
if len(filtered) > limit:
filtered = filtered[:limit]
return {
"records": filtered,
"count": len(filtered),
"from": from_,
"to": to,
"filters": {
"actor": actor, "exchange": exchange,
"action": action, "bot_tag": bot_tag,
},
}
return r
+43 -4
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@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
"""Bearer auth middleware: bearer token → request.state.environment."""
"""Bearer auth middleware: bearer token → request.state.environment.
Inoltre richiede header `X-Bot-Tag` su tutte le chiamate non whitelisted,
così che l'audit log identifichi il bot chiamante.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import secrets
@@ -9,7 +13,17 @@ from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
Environment = Literal["testnet", "mainnet"]
WHITELIST_PATHS = frozenset({"/health", "/apidocs", "/openapi.json", "/docs", "/redoc"})
# Path che bypassano sia bearer auth sia bot_tag check.
PATH_WHITELIST_FULL = frozenset(
{"/health", "/apidocs", "/openapi.json", "/docs", "/redoc"}
)
# Path che richiedono bearer ma NON il bot_tag (admin endpoint).
PATH_WHITELIST_BOT_TAG_ONLY = frozenset({"/admin/audit"})
# Backward-compat alias (vecchi import).
WHITELIST_PATHS = PATH_WHITELIST_FULL
MAX_BOT_TAG_LEN = 64
def _extract_bearer(auth_header: str) -> str | None:
@@ -35,13 +49,17 @@ def install_auth_middleware(
testnet_token: str,
mainnet_token: str,
) -> None:
"""Registra middleware di auth bearer sull'app FastAPI."""
"""Registra middleware di auth bearer + bot_tag sull'app FastAPI."""
@app.middleware("http")
async def auth_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
if request.url.path in WHITELIST_PATHS:
path = request.url.path
# 1. Whitelist totale: nessun check.
if path in PATH_WHITELIST_FULL:
return await call_next(request)
# 2. Bearer auth (sempre richiesto).
token = _extract_bearer(request.headers.get("Authorization", ""))
if token is None:
return JSONResponse(
@@ -57,4 +75,25 @@ def install_auth_middleware(
"message": "invalid token"}},
)
request.state.environment = env
# 3. Whitelist parziale (admin): bearer ok, no bot_tag check.
if path in PATH_WHITELIST_BOT_TAG_ONLY:
return await call_next(request)
# 4. X-Bot-Tag obbligatorio.
raw_tag = request.headers.get("X-Bot-Tag", "")
tag = raw_tag.strip() if raw_tag else ""
if not tag:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
content={"error": {"code": "BAD_REQUEST",
"message": "missing X-Bot-Tag header"}},
)
if len(tag) > MAX_BOT_TAG_LEN:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
content={"error": {"code": "BAD_REQUEST",
"message": "X-Bot-Tag too long"}},
)
request.state.bot_tag = tag
return await call_next(request)
+3
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@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ def _configure_audit_sink() -> None:
def audit_write_op(
*,
actor: str | None = None,
bot_tag: str | None = None,
action: str,
exchange: str,
target: str | None = None,
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ def audit_write_op(
actor: identificatore di chi ha invocato (es. "testnet", "mainnet",
oppure None per logging anonimo).
bot_tag: identificatore del bot chiamante (header X-Bot-Tag).
action: nome del tool (es. "place_order", "cancel_order").
exchange: identificatore servizio (deribit, bybit, alpaca, hyperliquid).
target: instrument/symbol/order_id su cui si agisce.
@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ def audit_write_op(
"action": action,
"exchange": exchange,
"actor": actor,
"bot_tag": bot_tag,
"target": target,
"payload": payload or {},
}
+3
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@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ async def audit_call(
) -> Any:
"""Esegue tool_fn e logga audit (success o error). Riraisola eccezioni."""
actor = getattr(request.state, "environment", None)
bot_tag = getattr(request.state, "bot_tag", None)
target = _extract_target(params, target_field)
payload = _safe_dump(params)
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ async def audit_call(
except Exception as e:
audit_write_op(
actor=actor,
bot_tag=bot_tag,
action=action,
exchange=exchange,
target=target,
@@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ async def audit_call(
audit_write_op(
actor=actor,
bot_tag=bot_tag,
action=action,
exchange=exchange,
target=target,