fix(upload): tipo da magic bytes, non da Content-Type dichiarato (#36 punto 2)

Il Content-Type del client non era verificato: un file "x.html" dichiarato
image/png veniva salvato e poi servito per estensione come text/html,
eseguito dal browser. Nuova detect_file_type() (PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP/PDF) in
files.py, usata anche dal logo in settings.py; l'estensione salvata segue
sempre il tipo rilevato, mai il nome file dichiarato dal client. Il logo
rifiuta SVG a prescindere (puo' portare script). Upload letti a blocchi da
1MB, interrotti appena superano il limite invece di bufferizzare tutto
prima di controllare la dimensione.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/backend/api/routers/files.py

@@ -26,6 +26,39 @@ ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES = {"image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/gif", "image/webp"}
 ALLOWED_PDF_TYPE = "application/pdf"
 ALLOWED_TYPES = ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES | {ALLOWED_PDF_TYPE}
 
+# Magic-byte signatures: the client-declared Content-Type is only what the
+# browser claimed and cannot be trusted (#36 point 2 — a file named "x.html"
+# declared image/png was stored and then served by extension as text/html,
+# which a browser executes). SVG is intentionally not recognised: it is not
+# in ALLOWED_TYPES and can itself carry script content.
+_MAGIC_SIGNATURES: list[tuple[bytes, str, str]] = [
+    # (signature, mime type, canonical extension)
+    (b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n", "image/png", ".png"),
+    (b"\xff\xd8\xff", "image/jpeg", ".jpg"),
+    (b"GIF87a", "image/gif", ".gif"),
+    (b"GIF89a", "image/gif", ".gif"),
+    (b"%PDF-", "application/pdf", ".pdf"),
+]
+
+# Read uploads in chunks so a declared-huge body is rejected as soon as it
+# crosses the limit, instead of being buffered into memory in full first.
+_UPLOAD_CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024
+
+
+def detect_file_type(content: bytes) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
+    """Identify a file's real type from its magic bytes.
+
+    Returns (mime_type, canonical_extension), or None when the content does
+    not match any type this system serves.
+    """
+    for signature, mime, ext in _MAGIC_SIGNATURES:
+        if content.startswith(signature):
+            return mime, ext
+    # WebP: "RIFF" + 4-byte little-endian size + "WEBP"; the size varies.
+    if len(content) >= 12 and content[0:4] == b"RIFF" and content[8:12] == b"WEBP":
+        return "image/webp", ".webp"
+    return None
+
 # Top-level folders nothing may DELETE through this router: statistics/reports are
 # audit records, the logo is only ever replaced via POST /api/settings/logo.
 _UNDELETABLE_PREFIXES = ("statistics/", "reports/", "logos/")
@@ -178,25 +211,36 @@ async def upload_file(
     """Upload an image or PDF file.
 
     Files are stored in uploads/{recipe_id}/{version_id}/
-    Thumbnails are generated for images.
+    Thumbnails are generated for images. The type is authoritatively
+    determined from the file's magic bytes, not the client-declared
+    Content-Type (#36 point 2): the stored extension always matches what was
+    actually detected, so it can never be served back as something else.
     """
-    # Validate file type
+    # Read in chunks, stopping as soon as the size limit is crossed instead
-    if not validate_file_type(file.content_type):
+    # of buffering an oversized body into memory first.
-        raise HTTPException(
+    max_bytes = settings.max_upload_size_mb * 1024 * 1024
-            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+    buffer = bytearray()
-            detail=f"File type {file.content_type} not allowed. Must be image or PDF.",
+    while True:
-        )
+        chunk = await file.read(_UPLOAD_CHUNK_SIZE)
-
+        if not chunk:
-    # Read file content
+            break
-    content = await file.read()
+        buffer.extend(chunk)
+        if len(buffer) > max_bytes:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+                detail=f"File size exceeds maximum {settings.max_upload_size_mb}MB",
+            )
+    content = bytes(buffer)
     file_size = len(content)
 
-    # Validate file size
+    # Validate file type from the actual bytes, not file.content_type
-    if not validate_file_size(file_size):
+    detected = detect_file_type(content)
+    if detected is None:
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
-            detail=f"File size {file_size} bytes exceeds maximum {settings.max_upload_size_mb}MB",
+            detail="File type not allowed. Must be a recognised image or PDF.",
         )
+    detected_mime, detected_ext = detected
 
     # Determine storage path
     if recipe_id is not None and version_id is not None:
@@ -206,18 +250,17 @@ async def upload_file(
 
     storage_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
 
-    # Sanitize the uploaded filename
+    # Sanitize the uploaded filename, then force its extension to the one
+    # actually detected: a declared/renamed extension is not trusted either.
     safe_filename = sanitize_filename(file.filename or "")
+    base_name = Path(safe_filename).stem or "file"
+    safe_filename = f"{base_name}{detected_ext}"
 
     # Generate unique filename if file already exists
     file_path = storage_dir / safe_filename
     counter = 1
     while file_path.exists():
-        name_parts = safe_filename.rsplit(".", 1)
+        file_path = storage_dir / f"{base_name}_{counter}{detected_ext}"
-        if len(name_parts) == 2:
-            file_path = storage_dir / f"{name_parts[0]}_{counter}.{name_parts[1]}"
-        else:
-            file_path = storage_dir / f"{safe_filename}_{counter}"
         counter += 1
 
     # Write file
@@ -225,7 +268,7 @@ async def upload_file(
 
     # Generate thumbnail for images
     thumbnail_path = None
-    if file.content_type in ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES:
+    if detected_mime in ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES:
         thumbnail_dir = storage_dir / "thumbnails"
         thumbnail_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
         thumbnail_path = thumbnail_dir / file_path.name
@@ -242,7 +285,7 @@ async def upload_file(
     return {
         "file_path": str(relative_path).replace("\\", "/"),
         "thumbnail_path": str(thumbnail_relative).replace("\\", "/") if thumbnail_relative else None,
-        "file_type": file.content_type,
+        "file_type": detected_mime,
         "file_size": file_size,
     }
 

src/backend/api/routers/settings.py

@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
 """System settings router - read/update settings, upload company logo."""
-from pathlib import Path
-
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, File, HTTPException, UploadFile, status
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
@@ -8,6 +6,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from src.backend.config import settings
 from src.backend.database import get_db
 from src.backend.api.middleware.api_key import get_current_user, require_admin_user
+from src.backend.api.routers.files import ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES, detect_file_type
 from src.backend.models.orm.setting import SystemSetting
 from src.backend.models.orm.user import User
 
@@ -126,35 +125,45 @@ async def upload_company_logo(
     """Upload company logo.
 
     Saves logo to uploads/logos/ and updates company_logo_path setting.
-    Only admins can upload the logo.
+    Only admins can upload the logo. The type is determined from the file's
+    magic bytes, not the client-declared Content-Type (#36 point 2). SVG is
+    refused outright: it can itself carry script content, and there is no
+    safe way to serve it inline for a logo shown on every page.
     """
-    # Validate file type (must be image)
+    # Read in chunks, stopping as soon as the size limit is crossed instead
-    allowed_types = {"image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/gif", "image/webp", "image/svg+xml"}
+    # of buffering an oversized body into memory first.
-    if file.content_type not in allowed_types:
+    max_bytes = settings.max_upload_size_mb * 1024 * 1024
-        raise HTTPException(
+    buffer = bytearray()
-            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+    chunk_size = 1024 * 1024
-            detail=f"File type {file.content_type} not allowed. Must be an image.",
+    while True:
-        )
+        chunk = await file.read(chunk_size)
-
+        if not chunk:
-    # Read file content
+            break
-    content = await file.read()
+        buffer.extend(chunk)
+        if len(buffer) > max_bytes:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+                detail=f"File size exceeds maximum {settings.max_upload_size_mb}MB",
+            )
+    content = bytes(buffer)
     file_size = len(content)
 
-    # Validate file size
+    # Validate file type from the actual bytes (SVG never matches: refused)
-    max_bytes = settings.max_upload_size_mb * 1024 * 1024
+    detected = detect_file_type(content)
-    if file_size > max_bytes:
+    if detected is None or detected[0] not in ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES:
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
-            detail=f"File size {file_size} bytes exceeds maximum {settings.max_upload_size_mb}MB",
+            detail="File type not allowed. Must be a recognised image (SVG is not accepted).",
         )
+    _detected_mime, detected_ext = detected
 
     # Create logos directory
     logos_dir = settings.upload_path / "logos"
     logos_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
 
-    # Use a fixed filename for the company logo
+    # Fixed filename for the company logo, extension forced to what was
-    file_extension = Path(file.filename).suffix
+    # actually detected (not what the client claimed or the filename said).
-    logo_filename = f"company_logo{file_extension}"
+    logo_filename = f"company_logo{detected_ext}"
     logo_path = logos_dir / logo_filename
 
     # Write file

src/backend/tests/test_files.py

@@ -65,6 +65,51 @@ class TestUploadFile:
         assert data["file_type"] == "image/jpeg"
         assert data["file_size"] > 0
 
+    async def test_extension_forced_to_detected_type_ignores_filename(
+        self, client: AsyncClient, maker_user: User, tmp_path: Path
+    ):
+        """gitea#36 point 2: the stored extension follows the detected magic
+        bytes, not the client-supplied filename — even a misleading one."""
+        jpeg_bytes = b"\xff\xd8\xff\xe0\x00\x10JFIF" + b"\x00" * 20 + b"\xff\xd9"
+
+        with patch("src.backend.api.routers.files.settings") as mock_settings:
+            mock_settings.upload_path = tmp_path
+            mock_settings.max_upload_size_mb = 50
+
+            resp = await client.post(
+                "/api/files/upload",
+                headers=auth_headers(maker_user),
+                # Filename claims .txt; content is a real JPEG.
+                files={"file": ("photo.txt", io.BytesIO(jpeg_bytes), "text/plain")},
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        data = resp.json()
+        assert data["file_type"] == "image/jpeg"
+        assert data["file_path"].endswith(".jpg")
+
+    async def test_upload_declared_type_lies_about_html_content(
+        self, client: AsyncClient, maker_user: User, tmp_path: Path
+    ):
+        """gitea#36 point 2: a file whose bytes are HTML must be rejected even
+        when the client declares Content-Type: image/png and names it .png —
+        this is what previously let a stored file be served back as
+        text/html by extension and executed by the browser."""
+        html_bytes = b"<html><body><script>alert(1)</script></body></html>"
+
+        with patch("src.backend.api.routers.files.settings") as mock_settings:
+            mock_settings.upload_path = tmp_path
+            mock_settings.max_upload_size_mb = 50
+
+            resp = await client.post(
+                "/api/files/upload",
+                headers=auth_headers(maker_user),
+                files={"file": ("x.png", io.BytesIO(html_bytes), "image/png")},
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+        assert not any(tmp_path.rglob("x.png"))
+
     async def test_upload_invalid_type(
         self, client: AsyncClient, maker_user: User
     ):

src/backend/tests/test_settings.py

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 """Tests for settings router (/api/settings)."""
+import io
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
 import pytest
 from httpx import AsyncClient
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
@@ -182,3 +186,80 @@ class TestUpdateSettingsValidation:
             json={"some_future_key": "anything"},
         )
         assert resp.status_code == 200
+
+
+class TestUploadLogo:
+    """POST /api/settings/logo tests (gitea#36 point 2)."""
+
+    _PNG_BYTES = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 20
+
+    async def test_valid_png_accepted(
+        self, client: AsyncClient, admin_user: User, tmp_path: Path
+    ):
+        with patch("src.backend.api.routers.settings.settings") as mock_settings:
+            mock_settings.upload_path = tmp_path
+            mock_settings.max_upload_size_mb = 50
+
+            resp = await client.post(
+                "/api/settings/logo",
+                headers=auth_headers(admin_user),
+                files={"file": ("logo.png", io.BytesIO(self._PNG_BYTES), "image/png")},
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json()["logo_path"].endswith(".png")
+
+    async def test_svg_refused_even_with_svg_content_type(
+        self, client: AsyncClient, admin_user: User, tmp_path: Path
+    ):
+        """SVG is refused outright, not just when it lies about its type."""
+        svg_bytes = b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert(1)</script></svg>'
+
+        with patch("src.backend.api.routers.settings.settings") as mock_settings:
+            mock_settings.upload_path = tmp_path
+            mock_settings.max_upload_size_mb = 50
+
+            resp = await client.post(
+                "/api/settings/logo",
+                headers=auth_headers(admin_user),
+                files={"file": ("logo.svg", io.BytesIO(svg_bytes), "image/svg+xml")},
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+        assert not any(tmp_path.rglob("*.svg"))
+
+    async def test_pdf_refused_for_logo(
+        self, client: AsyncClient, admin_user: User, tmp_path: Path
+    ):
+        """The logo slot only accepts images: files.py's PDF signature must
+        not slip through settings.py's narrower ALLOWED_IMAGE_TYPES check."""
+        pdf_bytes = b"%PDF-1.4\n" + b"\x00" * 20
+
+        with patch("src.backend.api.routers.settings.settings") as mock_settings:
+            mock_settings.upload_path = tmp_path
+            mock_settings.max_upload_size_mb = 50
+
+            resp = await client.post(
+                "/api/settings/logo",
+                headers=auth_headers(admin_user),
+                files={"file": ("logo.pdf", io.BytesIO(pdf_bytes), "application/pdf")},
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+    async def test_html_disguised_as_png_refused(
+        self, client: AsyncClient, admin_user: User, tmp_path: Path
+    ):
+        html_bytes = b"<html><body><script>alert(1)</script></body></html>"
+
+        with patch("src.backend.api.routers.settings.settings") as mock_settings:
+            mock_settings.upload_path = tmp_path
+            mock_settings.max_upload_size_mb = 50
+
+            resp = await client.post(
+                "/api/settings/logo",
+                headers=auth_headers(admin_user),
+                files={"file": ("logo.png", io.BytesIO(html_bytes), "image/png")},
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 400