fix(rate-limit): non fidarsi del primo hop di X-Forwarded-For (#7)
_client_ip usava il primo elemento di XFF, impostabile dal client. Ora usa l'elemento a -trusted_proxy_count (nuova impostazione, default 1, env TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT), quello aggiunto dal proxy fidato più esterno. Con trusted_proxy_count=0 XFF e X-Real-IP sono ignorati. Aggiunta anche web_concurrency (env WEB_CONCURRENCY, default 1): i bucket del rate limit sono per processo, con --workers N il limite configurato viene diviso per N (arrotondato per eccesso, minimo 1) in _effective_limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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- Login endpoint (/api/auth/login): limited to `rate_limit_login` req/min.
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- All other endpoints: limited to `rate_limit_general` req/min.
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Returns HTTP 429 with Retry-After header when limit exceeded.
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Both configured limits are divided across worker processes before being
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applied (see `_effective_limit`): each bucket lives in this process's
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memory, so with `--workers N` a single configured limit is enforced N
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times over across the cluster unless it is divided down first.
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"""
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LOGIN_PATH = "/api/auth/login"
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@@ -34,23 +39,48 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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@staticmethod
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def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Resolve the originating client IP, honoring proxy headers.
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"""Resolve the originating client IP behind `trusted_proxy_count` proxies.
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Order of precedence: ``X-Forwarded-For`` (first hop), ``X-Real-IP``,
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``request.client.host``. Required because Nginx and the Flask client
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sit between the tablet and the API; without parsing these headers
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every tablet shares one bucket.
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Nginx (and, behind it, the Flask client) each add one hop to
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X-Forwarded-For. The *leftmost* entries are whatever the original
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caller claimed and are trivially spoofed; trust only extends to the
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hops actually appended by our own trusted proxies, counted from the
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*right*. With `trusted_proxy_count = N`, the client IP is the Nth
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element from the end of XFF (the one added by the outermost trusted
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proxy). If XFF has fewer elements than that, or is absent, fall back
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to `request.client.host` - except that `X-Real-IP` is tried first when
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XFF is simply missing and at least one proxy is trusted.
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With `trusted_proxy_count = 0`, no proxy header is honored at all
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(neither XFF nor X-Real-IP) and only `request.client.host` is used.
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"""
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xff = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
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if xff:
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first = xff.split(",")[0].strip()
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if first:
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return first
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real = request.headers.get("x-real-ip")
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if real:
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return real.strip()
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count = settings.trusted_proxy_count
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if count > 0:
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xff = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
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if xff:
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hops = [h.strip() for h in xff.split(",") if h.strip()]
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if len(hops) >= count:
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return hops[-count]
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# Fewer hops than trusted proxies: the chain is short of what
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# was configured, so fall back rather than trust an
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# under-populated header.
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else:
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real = request.headers.get("x-real-ip")
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if real:
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return real.strip()
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return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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@staticmethod
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def _effective_limit(configured: int) -> int:
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"""Divide a configured per-minute limit across worker processes.
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Rounds up and never returns less than 1, so a low configured limit
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with high concurrency still allows at least one request per worker
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per window rather than locking everyone out.
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"""
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concurrency = max(settings.web_concurrency, 1)
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return max(1, -(-configured // concurrency))
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def _clean_window(self, timestamps: list[float], now: float) -> list[float]:
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"""Remove timestamps outside the current sliding window."""
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cutoff = now - self.WINDOW_SECONDS
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@@ -100,7 +130,8 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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# Check login-specific rate limit
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if path == self.LOGIN_PATH and request.method == "POST":
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allowed, retry_after = self._check_rate_limit(
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self._login_requests, client_ip, settings.rate_limit_login, now
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self._login_requests, client_ip,
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self._effective_limit(settings.rate_limit_login), now,
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)
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if not allowed:
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return JSONResponse(
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@@ -111,7 +142,8 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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# Check general rate limit
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allowed, retry_after = self._check_rate_limit(
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self._general_requests, client_ip, settings.rate_limit_general, now
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self._general_requests, client_ip,
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self._effective_limit(settings.rate_limit_general), now,
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)
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if not allowed:
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return JSONResponse(
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