fix(rate-limit): secchio login esteso a credenziali supervisore e setup (#8)

Il secchio "login" del rate limit valeva solo per /api/auth/login. Un
capoturno può ora essere attaccato a forza bruta anche via
/api/measurements/{id}/authorise e /api/production-runs/{id}/pause|
resume|close, senza mai toccare il bucket più permissivo "general".
_is_login_bucket_request confronta il path con un'espressione regolare,
non con ==, perché l'id in mezzo varia per richiesta.

Include anche la parte di #9 che riguarda questo stesso file: i path
sotto /api/setup/ entrano nello stesso secchio, indipendentemente dal
metodo (GET /api/setup/status accetta ora una password opzionale).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-21 22:34:42 +02:00
parent 1921bc3302
commit e91ef739af
3 changed files with 100 additions and 4 deletions
+36 -4
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
"""Rate limiting middleware for FastAPI.
Implements in-memory sliding window rate limiting per client IP.
Configurable limits for login and general endpoints.
Configurable limits for login and endpoints that carry credentials, and for
everything else.
"""
import re
import time
from collections import defaultdict
from typing import Callable
@@ -17,7 +19,12 @@ from src.backend.config import settings
class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Middleware that enforces per-IP rate limits using a sliding window.
- Login endpoint (/api/auth/login): limited to `rate_limit_login` req/min.
- Login bucket: `/api/auth/login`, the paths that carry a capoturno's
credentials (`/api/measurements/*/authorise`,
`/api/production-runs/{id}/pause|resume|close`), and everything under
`/api/setup/` (the setup password). Limited to `rate_limit_login`
req/min. Guessing a supervisor's or the setup password is the same
attack as guessing a login password, just aimed at a different endpoint.
- All other endpoints: limited to `rate_limit_general` req/min.
Returns HTTP 429 with Retry-After header when limit exceeded.
@@ -30,6 +37,14 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
LOGIN_PATH = "/api/auth/login"
WINDOW_SECONDS = 60
# Paths that carry a supervisor's (capoturno) credentials in the request
# body. Matched by pattern, not equality, because the id in the middle
# varies per request.
_SUPERVISOR_CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS = (
re.compile(r"^/api/measurements/\d+/authorise$"),
re.compile(r"^/api/production-runs/\d+/(?:pause|resume|close)$"),
)
def __init__(self, app) -> None:
super().__init__(app)
# {ip: [timestamp, ...]} per bucket
@@ -70,6 +85,22 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
return real.strip()
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
@classmethod
def _is_login_bucket_request(cls, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
"""Whether this request counts against the login bucket rather than general.
`/api/setup/*` is checked regardless of method: `GET /api/setup/status`
now accepts an optional password (see setup.py), so guessing it there
is the same attack as guessing it on any of the POST endpoints.
"""
if path.startswith("/api/setup/"):
return True
if method != "POST":
return False
if path == cls.LOGIN_PATH:
return True
return any(p.match(path) for p in cls._SUPERVISOR_CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS)
@staticmethod
def _effective_limit(configured: int) -> int:
"""Divide a configured per-minute limit across worker processes.
@@ -127,8 +158,9 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
self._evict_stale_ips(self._login_requests, now)
self._evict_stale_ips(self._general_requests, now)
# Check login-specific rate limit
if path == self.LOGIN_PATH and request.method == "POST":
# Check login-bucket rate limit (login itself, supervisor-credential
# paths, and the setup password)
if self._is_login_bucket_request(request.method, path):
allowed, retry_after = self._check_rate_limit(
self._login_requests, client_ip,
self._effective_limit(settings.rate_limit_login), now,